This lecture argues that the Global Financial Cycle is a challenge for the validity of the Mundellian trilemma. I present evidence that US monetary policy shocks are transmitted internationally and affect financial conditions even in inflation targeting economies with large financial markets. Hence flexible exchange rates are not enough to guarantee monetary autonomy in a world of large capital flows.
Introduction
The Mundellian trilemma states that it is not feasible to have at the same time a fixed exchange rate, full capital mobility and monetary policy independence. Only two of the three may coexist. The Trilemma is a useful concept. But studying more closely recent developments in the international economy, particularly the functioning of international financial markets, it may be time to revisit its analytical underpinnings and to qualify its meaning in a significant way. I will make a step in this direction in this lecture.
The trilemma argument builds on an arbitrage condition in international markets, the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition, which equates returns across bond markets in a world of perfect capital mobility. There is no question that under a fixed exchange-rate regime and full capital mobility, policy makers cannot set the interest rate at the level they believe appropriate for monetary conditions in their economy. Should they try to free their policy rate from foreign influences, they would be quickly flooded by large capital flows reversing their measures. On the other hand, a freely floating exchange rate in principle gives a central bank an additional degree of freedom. According to the Mundell-Fleming logic, once the exchange rate has taken care of foreign influences, the domestic interest rate is all that is needed to achieve the internal policy target, output stabilization. This is why the literature testing the empirical validity of the trilemma has focused on testing the comovements of countries' policy rates with the center country rate across exchange-rate regimes. If the domestic policy rate does not follow closely the center country, this is taken as evidence of monetary policy autonomy vis-a-vis the center. Policy rates (usually short-term interest rates) can of course be less correlated under a floating exchange-rate than under a fixed exchange-rate regime when there is free capital mobility. It is reassuring that a series of papers by Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2005) , Klein and Shambaugh (2013) , Goldberg (2013) and Obstfeld (2015) have consistently found that short rates are less correlated to the base country rate for flexible exchange rate countries than for fixed exchange rate countries 1 .
But that is not enough to show that countries can have independent monetary policies when 1 Long rate correlations however seem independent of the exchange-rate regime (see Obstfeld (2015) .
they have a floating exchange rate.
The Trilemma misleads us by assuming that domestic monetary and financial conditions shaping the macroeconomic situation of a country can be conveniently summarized by this one single variable, the short-term interest rate (see also Rey (2013) ). If that were the case, the extra degree of freedom gained through exchange-rate flexibility would indeed be enough to neutralize any effects of foreign financial conditions on the domestic macroeconomy. Yet, in a world of globalized finance with different types of capital flows and financial market imperfections, key countries' monetary policies may affect other countries' monetary conditions and financial stability in several ways. Financial imbalances may arise and, as a consequence, domestic output may be affected later on. Or the presence of foreign debt may lead to powerful balance sheet effects that will alter the effect of a monetary loosening, say, in the domestic economy. In such a world, letting the exchange rate float may not be enough to insulate the domestic economy, even if it is a large country, from global factors and permit monetary policy independence 2 .
The key question is how big this issue is and how far the trilemma morphed into a dilemma. Are domestic monetary and financial conditions largely determined by global factors, even in economies with freely floating exchange rates when there are large capital flows?
Is there an international credit or risk-taking channel of monetary policy and how would it affect financial stability? Is that transmission channel more potent for some currencies due to their special roles in international financial markets? Any answer must clarify the different dimensions along which domestic monetary and financial conditions can vary and how far each of them is affected by domestic monetary policy versus global factors in a context of free capital mobility. Achieving this would make it possible to assess fully the potency of the domestic monetary policy tool (the short rate) for open economies, large or small, with flexible exchange rates in our world of large capital flows. I will not be able to provide the answers to all these questions in this lecture, but I hope at least to advance the research agenda.
I begin by discussing different transmission channels of monetary policy in open economies
in models with and without financial frictions. I then sketch how important the dollar is as an international currency in banking and asset management, and how this may matter for the transmission of international monetary shocks. In a third part, I show that there is a global financial cycle that is influenced by the key country in the international monetary system, the United States. I then present evidence that US monetary policy shocks are transmitted even to advanced countries with a fully flexible exchange rate. I conclude with some observations on the usefulness of additional policy instruments such as macro-prudential policies.
Transmission channels of Monetary Policy
The literature (keynesian and neo-keynesian models, models with financial market frictions)
has analysed different transmission channels of monetary policy. I do a brief review of these channels and draw some implications regarding models of monetary policy for open economies.
Mundell-Fleming and New Open Economy Macroeconomics
Keynesian models, such as the Mundell-Fleming model, feature a strong exchange-rate channel for monetary transmission. In the case of a monetary loosening in the center country, demand in the center country goes up, boosting in particular exports from the periphery to the center (demand-augmenting effect). The return on the center country's bonds falls relative to the return on foreign ones, which induces an exchange rate depreciation. This makes the center country's goods cheaper than periphery goods thereby leading to expenditure switching out of the goods of the periphery (expenditure-switching effect). These two effects partly offset each other for the periphery. As previously discussed, periphery economies can pick their interest rate to stabilize output whenever their exchange rate is freely floating.
Financial spillovers are however not modelled.
The international transmission channel of monetary policy works differently in the bench-mark neo-keynesian model 3 . As noted by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000, 2002) , Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Benigno and Benigno (2003) , the optimal monetary policy trades off the stabilization of the output gap and the strengthening of the terms of trade. In these models, gains from international cooperation are usually found to be small if "one's house is in order", i.e. international spillovers are not large.
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Models with financial market frictions
The recent crisis has put the spotlight on financial market frictions and their importance for monetary policy transmission and financial stability. I focus on two channels broadly defined: the "credit channel" and the "risk-taking channel".
The literature has long ago recognized agency problems as an important source of business cycle amplification (Bernanke and Gertler (1989) ). When agency costs between borrowers and lenders are important, there is a wedge between the opportunity cost of internal finance and the cost of external finance: the external finance premium. This reflects the deadweight costs associated with the principal-agent problem and makes credit more expensive for a borrower. This external finance premium may depend on the stance of monetary policy.
Expansionary monetary policy leads to an increase in asset prices, particularly equity prices, which increases net worth of borrowers. This mitigates adverse selection and moral hazard problems, decreasing the size of the wedge between internal funds and external funding costs.
That then leads to an increase in lending and a increase in aggregate demand. I will use the term "credit channel" to describe this transmission channel (alternatives are "net worth channel", "balance sheet channel", "bank lending channel" and probably more) 5 . In the 3 See Woodford (2003) and Gali (2008) for a precise description of the model. For a recent survey on monetary trasmission mechanisms see Boivin et al. (2010) . 4 The older literature on international monetary cooperation (see Bryant et al. (1988) ) has also typically found low gains from coordination. Farhi and Werning (2014) show that it may be optimal for central banks to smoothe their terms of trade in a way that cannot be achieved solely with the policy rate (not enough instruments for all the targets). Bergin and Corsetti (2014) consider a model with a production externality, which may make gains from international cooperation higher. 5 The financial accelerator mechanism (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) ) has been mostly studied in the context of closed economies and initially applied to non-financial corporations and households (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) there is a pecuniary externality as agents do not internalize the decrease in prices caused by fire sales when they lever up.
In the "risk-taking channel" of monetary policy as described by Borio and Zhu (2012) and Bruno and Shin (2015b) , financial intermediation plays a key role and measured risk enters the financial friction. Models usually feature risk-neutral leveraged intermediaries subject to a value-at-risk constraint 6 . A positive shock raises demand for assets and this compresses risk premia. In turn lower risk premia relaxes further the value-at-risk constraint of intermediaries, which enables them to lever further. In such an environment, a looser monetary policy lowers financing costs and triggers this feedback loop. Some papers tend to emphasize "excessive risk-taking" due to a myopic value-at-risk constraint computed using recent measured risk parameters, others endogeneous movements in the exchange rate that loosen the constraint. All emphasize the procyclicality of leverage induced by the constraint, which may not be optimal from a macroeconomic point of view. 7 One could think of other ways of modeling excessive risk-taking such as government guarantees (bail out expectations) and limited liability and risk shifting.
Empirical evidence
Recent empirical evidence on the risk-taking channel for loan books has been provided by 7 Another potentially related channel of transmission of monetary policy is the "search for yield" (Rajan (2005) ). In a low interest rate environment, investors take on additional risk in order to secure higher yields. This could explain portfolio shifts from short run to long run assets and to emerging market assets when policy rates remain low for extended time periods.
To sum up, the "credit channel" and the "risk-taking channel" are potentially important channels of monetary policy transmissions. Both matter for financial stability, as they have implications for leverage of intermediaries, credit growth and asset pricing and may lead to "excessive risk-taking". 8 While the credit and risk-taking channels have been mostly studied in a closed economy context 9 , evidence is building up that they might be relevant in an international context as well. In an environment with foreign debt (often US dollar debt) on balance sheet, monetary policy in the domestic economy faces a tradeoff between stabilization of output and balance sheet effect. In this case, when the US increases interest rate, the domestic exchange rate depreciates, which stimulates domestic exports. On the other hand, this leads to an adverse balance sheet effect since the value of foreign debt goes up. As a result of this tradeoff, even with flexible exchange rates, the interest rate is not enough to achieve monetary autonomy. Aoki et al. (2015) find that the the benefit of a second instrument (macroprudential tools) for the domestic economy is larger the bigger the variance of the foreign interest rate shock 10 .
Monetary policy in the center country may therefore transmit itself internationally and be amplified via frictions in the capital markets affecting balance sheet and/or financial stability in the rest of world. This phenomenon will be all the more important for US monetary policy the more dominant the US dollar in international financial markets.
The geography of US dollar finance
There is a large literature discussing the importance of the dollar as an international currency and emphasizing its various roles in invoicing, pegging, issuance of financial assets, as vehicle 8 It is worth remembering that credit booms have been found to be the best predictor of financial crises (Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012), Schularick and Taylor (2012)) 9 Bruno and Shin (2015b) is an exception for the "risk-taking channel" 10 Farhi and Werning (2015) study a range of models with aggregate demand externalities or pecuniary externalities. In particular they analyse a model with nominal rigidities, market incompleteness and foreign currency debt. They too find that additional tools (in their case taxing foreign currency debt) is optimal currency in foreign exchange markets and in commodity trade 11 . There is considerable work on the functioning of the international monetary system with the dollar as a key currency 12 discussing the role of the US as a world banker, insurer or liquidity provider.
The transmission of US monetary policy and of crises in the context of a fixed exchange rate regime (the Gold Standard) has been analysed by Eichengreen (1992) . Notes: cross-border positions and local positions by reporting banks in foreign currency disaggregated by currency (bn). Source: BIS.
emerging market fund assets (mostly dollars) have grown by 350%. The top 10 global asset management firms account in 2014 for more than $19 trillion in assets under management.
As stipulated by the "credit channel", banks, companies and households find it easier to borrow when they have high net worth, as they can more easily meet required financial ratios or collateral requirements or can make higher down payments. In the international economy, the dollar is used around the globe as an investing currency and a funding currency. Similarly in models in which financial intermediaries operate under value-at-risk constraints, cheap funding will tend to compress spreads, lower measured risk, relax the constraint and enable further leverage (Borio and Zhu (2012)). This positive effect on the balance sheet could be further strengthened by an appreciation of the domestic currency (see Bruno and Shin (2015a)) 14 . Given the prevalence of dollar funding in the international economy as well as the importance of dollar assets in many portfolios around the globe, the credit channel or the risk-taking channel broadly defined could be a potent channel of international transmission of monetary policy. I now proceed to look for it in the data.
Smoking gun: the Global Financial Cycle
There is a growing literature documenting a high degree of comovement in risky asset prices, credit growth, leverage and financial aggregates around the world, a phenomenon I called the Global Financial Cycle in Rey (2013) 15 .
Risky asset prices around the globe, from stocks to corporate bonds, have an important common component (Miranda Agrippino and Rey (2012)) 16 . So do capital flows which are highly correlated with one another and negatively correlated with the VIX or other indices of "market fear" (see also Forbes and Warnock (2012) ). Leverage and leverage growth are 14 Because of the size of the US market in the world economy, a monetary loosening by the Fed may have a non-negligible effect on US imports, which in turn will affect the income and net worth of exporting firms in other countries. 15 The global financial cycle is different from the national financial cycles described by Drehmann et al. (2012)). 18 While seeing a lot of comovement in asset prices worldwide may just be reflecting market integration, the fact that these comovements are to some extent caused by US monetary policy is important.
As capital flows respond to US monetary policy, they may not be appropriate for the 
Identification of US monetary policy shocks in VARs
As underlined by Watson (2008, 2012) , the identification problem in structural VAR analysis is how to go from the moving-average representation in terms of the innovations to the impulse response function with respect to a unit increase in the structural shock of interest, which is here the US monetary policy shock. One classic answer to this problem has been to impose economic restrictions such as timing restrictions (some variables move within the month, others are slower moving). This has permitted identification of the coefficients of interest (see Bernanke and Gertler (1995) , Christiano et al (1995) ). Romer (1989, 2004 ) introduce an alternative identification strategy: the "narrative approach". They use information from outside the VAR to construct exogenous components of specific shocks.
Those are often treated as exogenous shocks. However, technically they are instrumental variables for the shocks: they measure (typically with some error) an exogenous component of the shock, so that the constructed series is correlated with the shock of interest but not with other structural shocks. Hence those are "external" instruments, because they use information external to the VAR for identification 19 . It is very clear that when one tries to identify the credit channel of monetary policy (broadly defined), movements in asset prices and spreads are key, as they are related to agency problems or risk shifting or to the operation of value-at-risk constraints depending on the friction considered in the model. Hence, it is important to use an identification strategy which allows for immediate responses in asset prices, as there is probably little delay in those market reactions. As shown in Gertler and
Karadi (2015) with monthly data, an identification strategy based on timing restrictions may sometimes fail to identify the credit channel.
In this paper, I mostly follow Gertler and Karadi (2015) This is important in a period where the Fed funds rate has hit the zero lower bound. For each VAR, I test for the strength of the instruments using an F-test and implement the specification accordingly.
The structural VAR is
where the variables of interest for the US VAR are the one-year rate (instrumented), the CPI, Industrial Production (IP), a measure of mortgage spread, a measure of commercial paper spread and the VIX. The structural white noise shocks are ε t .
The reduced form VAR can be written as:
and the variance covariance matrix of the reduced form VAR is to recover the relevant structural shock: 
Effects of US monetary policy shocks on the US economy and on global factors
I start by estimating a monthly VAR looking at the effect of US monetary policy shocks on the standard real economy variables (US CPI and US IP) but also including financial variables able to capture risk-taking or the credit channel: US mortgage spread, corporate 21 For more details see Mertens and Ravn (2013) . What do we learn from the results?
In the domestic US context, a 20 bp increase in the US one-year rate leads to an 8 bp increase in the mortgage spread very rapidly (in the first 3 months or so). In each of these countries, a US tightening has a significant and almost immediate effect on mortgage spreads.
It peaks at around 9 bp in Canada within 2 months of the tightening. It peaks at about The magnitude of the effect of US monetary policy shocks on mortgage spreads of those advanced economies which are all inflation targeters is therefore heterogeneous across countries but is roughly of the same order of magnitude as the effect estimated within US borders.
The smallest response (for Sweden) is still about half of the US mortgage spread response to the US home monetary policy shock, and the largest response (for New Zealand) is equal to more than twice the US response. The UK response is also larger than the US one, so that a US monetary policy shock seems to affect the UK mortgage market more than the US one. Without putting too much faith on each of these point estimates, there seems to be a general pattern in the data: credit conditions, as measured by mortgage spreads, respond to US monetary policy shocks rapidly in this set of inflation targeting advanced economies.
Whether one considers these findings as evidence of a very potent international transmission channel of monetary policy has to depend on whether one thinks that channel is an important one within US borders. If the answer is positive, then this international transmission channel is of a similar magnitude. It would be desirable to be able to estimate more measures of the The VARs give us some idea of the strength of these two channels by analysing the response of the policy rate to the US policy shock. In two economies, Canada and New Zealand, the policy rate seems to be reacting to US monetary policy shocks. For the other economies, there seems to be no significant response (Sweden, UK). Local currencies tend to depreciate against the US dollar when there is a surprise tightening by the Fed (Canadian dollar, Swedish krona, sterling), while the New Zealand dollar tends to appreciate.
There is also interesting heterogeneity in the response of real economy variables, though the magnitude and significance of these results does not appear as robust across specifications (for some of them) than the results on the mortgage spreads. Nevertheless, the shape of the impulse responses is similar across specifications.
As shown in Figure 5 Canadian IP tends to go down after 20 months while the CPI tends to increase by about 20 bp after 10 months (but those results are not as strong in Figure   9 ). In Figure 9 , we note that the Canadian dollar tends to depreciate immediately after a surprise tightening of US monetary policy, and this happens despite an increase in the Canadian policy rate.
Swedish IP does not seem very much affected and there is also little effect on the CPI.
These results are consistent across specifications. The Swedish krona has a small immediate depreciation (see Figure 10 ).
UK IP does not seem much affected (though in some specifications it goes down after about 10 months) while the UK CPI goes up by about 10bp, and this is consistent across specifications. Sterling depreciates following a tightening but does so with a delay, unlike the Canadian dollar and the Swedish krona (see Figure 11 ).
New Zealand GDP's response is not very stable across specifications while the CPI goes up in all specifications. The New Zealand dollar tends to appreciate, unlike the other currencies (see Figure 12 ).
To summarize, a US monetary policy tightening has immediate effects on domestic financial conditions in Wellington, Ottawa, Stockholm and London. The magnitude of these effects is similar to the magnitude of the effect of the US domestic monetary policy shock on its own mortgage spread. It is accompanied only in some of the economies by a response of the policy rate and in most cases by an exchange rate depreciation. Mortgage spreads are an important indicator of financial conditions, as real estate markets are often at the center of financial stability considerations.
None of this means that the exchange rate regime is irrelevant. It means only that a flexible exchange rate is not enough to insulate a country from the Global Financial Cycle.
It also means that measuring monetary autonomy via the metric of correlation of shortterm rates will have little to say about the potency of the international credit or risktaking channel. The trilemma, by focusing exclusively on the interest rate, seems to miss a potentially important channel of transmission of monetary policy in international markets.
If the international credit channel is potent, then the trilemma becomes more like a dilemma. More tools need to be added to restore some monetary and financial autonomy. This is the topic to which I now turn.
International spillovers and macroprudential policies
If the international credit or risk-taking channel is important, the Global Financial Cycle cannot be tamed by relying on the domestic interest rate alone to achieve both output stabilization and financial stability. Hence there is a need for additional instruments: macroprudential tools and may be sometimes capital controls. My discussion of macroprudential policies is limited to the points coming out of the analysis of international spillovers. we would benefit from a more granular modeling of these actors. Finally, proper calibration and timely implementation of macroprudential measures will probably be the dominant policy issue.
Conclusion
Central banks transmit their monetary policy within their jurisdictions and across jurisdictions via several channels.
The neo-keynesian models emphasize how short-term rates and expectations of the path of future rates affect inflation expectations and hence short-term and long-term real rates.
The broadly defined credit and risk-taking channels affect the external finance premium (or relax a value-at-risk constraint) and as a consequence affect aggregate demand and risk- or value-at-risk constraints. When asset prices are high, spreads are low and measured risk is low, hence there is a negative correlation between indices of risk and leverage. Via the credit and the risk-taking channels US monetary policy is transmitted across jurisdictions and matters for global financial stability and economic activity. This discussion should clarify that looking at correlations of short term policy rates across countries to assess the degree of monetary independence and test the validity of the trilemma provides little information on the strength of the financial spillover channels discussed here.
The international credit and risk-taking channels can interact with the well-known "fear of floating" channel. Following a Fed loosening, if another central bank also loosens its policy rate or intervenes to prevent its exchange rate from appreciating because of large capital inflows, the domestic credit channel in the recipient country will tend to reinforce the international credit channel, leading to potential credit booms. The role of the exchange rate is ambiguous, as sustained appreciation and deviation from uncovered interest parity may tend to reinforce the balance sheet effect of increased asset prices and increased value of collateral in the recipient countries, relaxing further value-at-risk constraints (see Bruno and Shin (2015b) ). Those same mechanisms may work also in reverse and lead to potential busts.
The empirical evidence points towards some combination of these channels of mone- 
